This is a continuation from Part 1 of the proposal I sent to the national
strategy commission of the government of Japan.
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The
Symptomatic Issues
Japan’s
problems cannot be solved separately from one another. The causes and
consequent problems must be approached in their entirety as closely interlinked issues
that have been developing prior to 3.11.
With a
fertility rate at just 1.35 per person, 40% of the population will be over 65
years old by 2060 and the total population reduced by 30% to 86.75 million
people. The difficulties that stem from these demographic
issues will only continue to increase for following
generations under the present circumstances. As a result, Japan must devise
methods that will enable its population to be more efficient with fewer
resources. Japan must be willing to venture into new sectors that are knowledge
based and that will build on the tools that Japan has
available as a first world country. Currently, however, the burdens simply
continue to grow.
While
foreign investment returns have managed to offset the trade deficit and the
current account still supports a surplus, the latter narrowed to a record low
by 43.9% to 9.629 trillion yen in 2011. The Japanese deficit has
now reached a record 958 trillion yen. This amounts to 7.6 million yen for
every man, woman and child, compared to the U.S. 3.8 million yen per capita. In
the U.S., this large number fuels heated debates and disruption, but in Japan
the issue has barely been raised and the populace seems to be accepting it
quite complacently. With projections of the deficit increasing by another 13%
over the next year to 1,085 trillion yen – the equivalent to the GDP of
Switzerland – the country will soon not be able to maintain the deficit at “local”
rates and will have to seek foreign investors at
significantly higher global rates.
The
Japanese government also announced its first annual merchandise trade deficit,
since 1980, of 2.49 trillion yen this year. Exports have decreased by 2.7% and
imports have increased by 12%, particularly of oil and liquefied natural gas,
due to the nuclear disaster and the subsequent energy shortage. While this was
partially caused by the Great East Earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident, the
floods in Thailand, and Euro crisis, the long term trend has already been
showing evident signs of decreasing exports due to the lack of innovation, expansion, and product development.
Nothing is
being done to change this. Japan is increasingly becoming a low margin “parts”
supplier in juxtaposition to China and Korea. Many also
in fact prefer to discourage businesses from moving or expanding overseas in
their efforts to prevent the “hollowing out” of
corporate Japan. However, when both the supply and demand side of an industry
is overseas, it is logical for the more mature industries to locate closer to
their suppliers and customers. “Hollowing out” would also cease to be an issue
if new industries were created to fill the vacuum. For this to occur, globally
relevant innovation, that is not purely domestic and incremental, is paramount.
Many do
recognize the importance of innovation. However, the methods to initiate it
within Japan are poor. The government here always favours the distribution of subsidies, which in fact foster moral hazards
and additional obstacles to the form of innovation that needs to be accomplished.
Due to the presence of too many subsidies, growth beyond research is stifled
and actual product development never takes place.
Furthermore,
while a strong yen may
have negative effects on exports, it is also a powerful opportunity that Japan
fails to utilize. This is very discouraging, considering the fact that Japanese
corporations ought to be utilizing the yen’s purchasing power in global
markets. Instead, they continue to behave very timidly and have amassed a cash
hoard of approximately 200 trillion yen. While foreign
acquisitions have increased, the reality is that in 2011
only 6.3 trillion yen was spent on acquiring foreign businesses. Additionally,
due to the lack of real integration, profits and dividend income from these
overseas sources that are purchased are relatively low, especially compared to
those of the US and UK. The profit margin for
US acquisitions averaged 8.9%, 7.5% for the U.K, and a mere 4.6% in Japan.
The lack of
corporate spending and integration overseas
is a clear example of the Japanese aversion to risk, which is also emulated
within Japanese governmental policy. For example, the majority of Japanese
government deficit spending is funded by the issuance of Japanese
government bonds (JGBs). This is the favoured method over raising
taxes, since it is
generally cheaper, easier to implement, and politically safer. JGBs, in turn,
are purchased by Japanese corporations who prefer risk free investments over
other forms of value creation. A stable market for government debt issuance is
created, and this internal rate of borrowing creates a “safe haven” compared to other currencies and continues to
keep the yen artificially high.
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Your
comments are always welcome.

